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OPINION OF THE COURT 
___________ 
 
 
LEWIS, Circuit Judge. 
 In Geisinger Health Plan v. Commissioner of Internal 
Revenue, 985 F.2d 1210 (3d Cir. 1993) ("Geisinger I"), we held 
that the Geisinger Health Plan ("GHP"), a health maintenance 
organization ("HMO"), was not entitled to exemption from federal 
income taxation as a charitable organization under 26 U.S.C. 
§ 501(c)(3).  We remanded the case for determination of whether 
GHP was entitled to exemption from taxation by virtue of being an 
integral part of the Geisinger System (the "System"), a 
comprehensive health care system serving northeastern and 
northcentral Pennsylvania.  We will affirm the Tax Court's 
decision that it is not exempt as an integral part of the System. 
I. 
 GHP is a prepaid health care plan which contracts with 
health care providers to provide services to its subscribers. The 
facts relevant to GHP's function are detailed in our opinion in 
Geisinger I, and we need not repeat them here.  Instead, far more 
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relevant to this appeal is GHP's relationship with the Geisinger 
System and its other constituent entities, a relationship which 
we must examine in some detail to decide the issue before us. 
 The Geisinger System consists of GHP and eight other 
nonprofit entities, all involved in some way in promoting health 
care in 27 counties in northeastern and northcentral 
Pennsylvania.  They are:  the Geisinger Foundation (the 
"Foundation"), Geisinger Medical Center ("GMC"), Geisinger Clinic 
(the "Clinic"), Geisinger Wyoming Valley Medical Center ("GWV"), 
Marworth, Geisinger System Services ("GSS") and two professional 
liability trusts.  All of these entities are recognized as exempt 
from federal income taxation under one or more sections of the 
Internal Revenue Code.   
 The Foundation controls all these entities, as well as 
three for-profit corporations.  It has the power to appoint the 
corporate members of GHP, GMC, GWV, GSS, the Clinic and Marworth, 
and those members elect the boards of directors of those 
entities.  The Foundation also raises funds for the Geisinger 
System.  Its board of directors is composed of civic and business 
leaders in the area.   
 GMC operates a 569-bed regional medical center.  As of 
March 31, 1988, it had 3,512 employees, including 195 resident 
physicians and fellows in approved postgraduate training 
programs.  It accepts patients without regard to ability to pay, 
including Medicare, Medicaid and charity patients.  It operates a 
full-time emergency room open to all, regardless of ability to 
pay.  It also serves as a teaching hospital.   
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 GWV is a 230-bed hospital located in Wilkes-Barre, 
Pennsylvania.  It accepts patients regardless of ability to pay, 
and it operates a full-time emergency room open to all, 
regardless of ability to pay.   
 The Clinic provides medical services to patients at 43 
locations throughout the System's service area.  It also conducts 
extensive medical research in conjunction with GMC and physicians 
who perform medical services for GMC, GWV and other entities in 
the Geisinger System.  As of March 31, 1988, it employed 401 
physicians.  It accepts patients without regard to their ability 
to pay.   
 Marworth operates two alcohol detoxification and 
rehabilitation centers and offers educational programs to prevent 
alcohol and substance abuse.   
 GSS employs management and other personnel who provide 
services to entities in the Geisinger System.   
 As we noted in Geisinger I, the Geisinger System 
apparently decided to create GHP after GMC experimented with a 
pilot prepaid health plan between 1972 and 1985.  The experience 
was positive, and the Geisinger System formed GHP to provide its 
own prepaid health plan. 
 It organized GHP as a separate entity within the System 
(as opposed to operating it from within the Clinic, GMC or GWV) 
for three reasons.  First, HMOs in Pennsylvania are subject to 
extensive regulation by the Commonwealth's Departments of Health 
and Insurance.  See generally 40 P.S. §§ 1551 et seq.  Operating 
GHP separately enables other entities in the System to avoid 
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having to comply with the burdensome requirements associated with 
that regulation.  Second, those administering the System believe 
it preferable for GHP's organization and management to remain 
separate from those of the System's other entities because it 
serves a wider geographic area than any of those other entities. 
Finally, under Pennsylvania law at least one-third of GHP's 
directors must be subscribers.  28 Pa. Code § 9.96(a). 
Establishing GHP as a separate entity avoids disrupting the 
governance of the other Geisinger System entities to comply with 
this requirement.  For example, establishing an HMO within GMC 
would have required GMC to canvass its board of directors to 
ensure that one-third of them subscribed to the HMO.  If they did 
not, GMC would have had to amend its by-laws or other governing 
documents to add directorships so that one-third of the directors 
were subscribers.  Incorporating GHP separately eliminates the 
need for such reorganization. 
 For the year which ended June 30, 1987, GHP generated 
8.8 percent of the aggregate gross receipts of the five health 
care providers0 in the Geisinger System.  At the time this case 
was first submitted to the Tax Court, projections indicated that 
by June 30, 1991, GHP would generate 14.35 percent of the 
System's aggregate gross receipts.0 
                     
0
 These are GHP, GMC, GWV, the Clinic and Marworth.  GHP is 
included among these five health care "providers" although, 
as noted in Geisinger I, GHP itself provides no health care 
but instead arranges that its subscribers will receive 
health care from others.  Geisinger I, 985 F.2d at 1213. 
0
 Because it is likely that many GHP subscribers would have 
used Geisinger facilities before purchasing GHP coverage (as 
insureds of Blue Cross or private insurers), this percentage 
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 GHP's interaction with other Geisinger System entities 
is varied.  Its most significant contact is with the Clinic, from 
which it purchases the physician services its subscribers require 
by paying a fixed amount per member per month, as set forth in a 
Medical Services Agreement.  Eighty-four percent of physician 
services are provided by doctors who are employees of the Clinic; 
the remaining 16 percent are provided by doctors who are not 
affiliated with the Clinic but who have contracted with the 
Clinic to provide services to GHP subscribers.  GHP has similarly 
entered into contracts with GMC and GWV, as well as 20 
non-related hospitals.  When its subscribers require hospital 
care, these hospitals provide it pursuant to the terms of their 
contracts, for either a negotiated per diem charge or a 
discounted percentage of billed charges.  GHP has also contracted 
with GSS to purchase office space, supplies and administrative 
services. 
 Except in emergency situations, only physicians who 
either work for the Clinic or have contracted with the Clinic may 
order that a GHP subscriber be admitted to a hospital.  When such 
admission is ordered, it generally must be to GMC, GWV or one of 
the 20 other hospitals with which GHP has contracted.  The only 
exceptions to this requirement are in a medical emergency outside 
of GHP's service area or when approved in advance by GHP's 
medical director; in those instances, a subscriber may be 
                                                                  
does not necessarily represent a net increase in utilization 
of Geisinger facilities by virtue of GHP's existence. 
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admitted to a hospital with which GHP has no contractual 
relationship. 
 GHP has also entered into contracts with pharmacies, 
durable medical equipment suppliers, ambulance services and 
physical therapists.  Those entities' services are available to 
subscribers only (1) in a medical emergency or (2) when 
prescribed by a doctor who is employed by the Clinic or who is 
under contract with the Clinic to provide care to GHP 
subscribers. 
 The Tax Court considered GHP's role in the Geisinger 
System when, on remand from Geisinger I, it decided that GHP did 
not qualify for exempt status under the integral part doctrine. 
Geisinger Health Plan v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 100 
T.C. 394 (1993) ("Geisinger II").  The court first distinguished 
a series of "group practice cases," in which incorporated groups 
of doctors on hospital or faculty medical staffs were held to be 
exempt from taxation as integral parts of the tax-exempt 
hospitals or medical schools with which they were associated. The 
Tax Court found that those cases did not control its decision 
because "[f]or [them] to apply here, the population of [GHP's] 
subscribers would have to overlap substantially with the patients 
of the related exempt entities [and t]he facts indicated that it 
does not."  Geisinger II, 100 T.C. at 404.  Moreover, it held, 
GHP was not entitled to tax-exempt status as an integral part of 
the System because it would produce unrelated business income for 
the Clinic, GMC or GWV if one of those entities were to absorb 
its activities.  Id. at 404-06.  A timely appeal followed; as 
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noted previously, we will affirm, although we will do so on 
grounds which differ from those on which the Tax Court rested. 
Specifically, because we deem it unnecessary to decide, we will 
not reach the issue whether GHP would produce unrelated business 
income if it were part of some entity created by merging its 
operations with one of the other Geisinger System entities. 
II. 
 Generally, separately incorporated entities must 
qualify for tax exemption on their own merits.  Mutual Aid 
Association of the Church of the Brethren v. United States, 759 
F.2d 792, 795 n.3 (10th Cir. 1985); cf. Moline Properties, Inc. 
v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 319 U.S. 436 (1943).  In 
Geisinger I, we decided that GHP cannot qualify for tax exemption 
on its own merits.  The question before us now is whether it 
comes within the "integral part doctrine," which may best be 
described as an exception to the general rule that entitlement to 
exemption is derived solely from an entity's own characteristics. 
See Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") brief at 20 (regulation 
providing basis for doctrine "implies that an organization whose 
sole activity is an `integral part' of the exempt activities of a 
related charity may derive its exemption from that of its 
affiliate").  As it did with the issue of whether it was entitled 
to exemption standing alone, see Geisinger I, 985 F.2d at 1214, 
GHP bears the burden of proving entitlement to exemption under 
the integral part doctrine.  Also as in Geisinger I, 985 F.2d at 
1212, we will apply plenary review, both because of the 
stipulated administrative nature of the record and because we 
9 
focus on a test which differs from that upon which the Tax Court 
relied in rendering its decision.  Cf. Inwood Laboratories, Inc. 
v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 855 n.15 (1982) (citing 
United States v. Singer Manufacturing Co., 374 U.S. 174, 194-95 
n.9 (1963) (even when reviewing findings of fact subject to 
clearly erroneous review, appellate court may decide case as a 
matter of law if the factfinder applied an improper standard to 
the facts)). 
A. 
 In Geisinger I, we described the integral part doctrine 
as follows: 
The integral part doctrine provides a means 
by which organizations may qualify for 
exemption vicariously through related 
organizations, as long as they are engaged in 
activities which would be exempt if the 
related organizations engaged in them, and as 
long as those activities are furthering the 
exempt purposes of the related organizations. 
Geisinger I, 985 F.2d at 1220.  The Tax Court on remand stated: 
The parties agree that an organization is 
entitled to exemption as an integral part of 
a tax-exempt affiliate if its activities are 
carried out under the supervision or control 
of an exempt organization and could be 
carried out by the exempt organization 
without constituting an unrelated trade or 
business. 
Geisinger  II, 100 T.C. at 402; see 26 C.F.R. §1.502-1(b). 
 GHP argues that these statements require us to examine 
whether the Clinic or GMC could retain tax-exempt status if it 
were to absorb GHP.  It thus compares the attributes of a 
hypothetically merged Clinic/GHP or GMC/GHP entity to the 
attributes of the HMO held to be exempt in Sound Health 
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Association v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 158 (1978), acq. 1981-2 
C.B. 2.0  Concluding that the merged entity would display more 
indicia of entitlement to exemption than the Sound Health HMO, 
GHP urges that it is exempt because of the characteristics of the 
hypothetical merged entity.  Despite its superficial appeal, we 
reject this argument and hold that the integral part doctrine 
does not mean that GHP would be exempt solely because either GMC 
or the Clinic could absorb it while retaining its tax-exempt 
status.  While this is a necessary condition to applying the 
doctrine, it is not the only condition.  GHP is separately 
incorporated for reasons it found administratively and 
politically advantageous.  While it may certainly benefit from 
that separate incorporation, it must also cope with the 
consequences flowing from it.  Cf. Moline Properties, 319 U.S. at 
438-39. 
 We acknowledge that interpreting the integral part 
doctrine in the manner GHP urges might enable entities to choose 
their organizational structures based on efficiency concerns 
rather than perverting those concerns by making tax 
considerations relevant.  In our view, however, there are 
countervailing policy concerns which justify determining each 
entity's tax status based upon its own organizational structure. 
                     
0
 In Sound Health, the Tax Court ruled exempt an HMO which 
charged subscribers fees based upon a community rating 
system, subsidized the dues of subscribers who could not 
afford to pay, provided health care services (sometimes at 
no or a reduced charge) to both subscribers and members of 
the general public, treated emergency patients regardless of 
ability to pay and offered public educational programs 
regarding health. 
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It is less complex and more certain for courts and administrators 
to assess an entity's tax status in light of its unique 
organizational composition and its association with another 
entity, and only to have to take into account some hypothetical 
combination of organizations as a second step in those relatively 
rare instances when an organization meets the other precondition 
of integral part status we set forth below.  See II.C. infra.  We 
recognize that it may appear overly technical to tax GHP 
differently from a GMC/GHP or a Clinic/GHP combination, for 
instance, merely because it is incorporated separately.  On the 
other hand, to tax GHP differently merely because it is related 
to those entities, without searching for indicia that its 
association with them enhances its own tax-exempt 
characteristics, would be inconsistent with the narrow 
construction generally accorded tax exemptions.  See Bingler v. 
Johnson, 394 U.S. 741, 752 (1969); Commissioner of Internal 
Revenue v. Jacobson, 336 U.S. 28, 48-49 (1949); Storall 
Manufacturing Co., Inc. v. United States, 755 F.2d 664, 665 (8th 
Cir. 1985). 
 Accordingly, we will determine whether GHP is exempt 
from taxation when examined not only in the context of its 
relationship with the other entities in the System, but also 
based upon its own organizational structure.  In doing so, we 
bear in mind that we are not bound by the description of the 
integral part doctrine set forth in dicta in Geisinger I. 
B. 
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 As the Tax Court recognized, 100 T.C. at 401, the 
integral part doctrine is not codified.  Its genesis may be found 
in a phrase contained within a regulation which speaks of a 
subsidiary being exempt "on the ground that its activities are an 
integral part of the activities of the parent organization."  26 
C.F.R. § 1.502-1(b); see generally General Counsel Memorandum 
39,830 (August 30, 1990).0  This reference to the doctrine is 
only fully understood, however, when one considers it in the 
context of the regulation and the statute it implements.  Section 
502 of the Internal Revenue Code (the "feeder organization rule") 
provides that an organization engaged in a trade or business for 
profit will be taxed even if it pays all of its profits over to 
an exempt organization.  26 U.S.C. § 502(a).  See generally 9 
Merten's Law of Federal Income Taxation § 34.01 at 5.  The 
regulation interpreting this section of the Code makes clear that 
[i]n the case of an organization operated for 
the primary purpose of carrying on a trade or 
business for profit, exemption is not allowed 
. . . on the ground that all the profits of 
such organization are payable to one or more 
[exempt] organizations . . . . 
26 C.F.R. § 502-1(b). 
 The integral part doctrine arises from an exception to 
this "feeder organization" rule.  Regulation 502-1(b) states that 
despite the general rule of taxation of "feeder organizations," 
                     
0
 We cite this General Counsel memorandum, which was issued in 
connection with GHP's application for exemption, Loren 
Callan Rosenzweig, Geisinger, HMOs and Health Care Reform, 
Taxes, January 1994, at 20, 23 n.27, as providing helpful 
background regarding the integral part doctrine.  We do not 
adopt its legal conclusions. 
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[i]f a subsidiary organization of a tax-
exempt organization would itself be exempt on 
the ground that its activities are an 
integral part of the exempt activities of the 
parent organization, its exemption will not 
be lost because, as a matter of accounting 
between the two organizations, the subsidiary 
derives a profit from its dealings with the 
parent organization[.] 
26 C.F.R. § 1.502-1(b) (emphasis added).  To illustrate how this 
exemption might apply to an entity, the regulation describes "a 
subsidiary organization which is operated for the sole purpose of 
furnishing electric power used by its parent organization, a tax-
exempt organization, in carrying out its educational activities." 
Id.0  See also Rev. Rul. 78-41, 1978-1 C.B. 148 (trust existing 
solely as a repository of funds set aside by nonprofit hospital 
for the payment of malpractice claims against the hospital, and 
as the payor of those claims, was exempt as an integral part of 
the hospital); Rev. Rul. 63-235, 1963-2 C.B. 210 (incidental 
publication and sale of law journals did not prevent journal 
corporation from being exempt as "adjunct to" an exempt law 
school); Rev. Rul. 58-194, 1958-1 C.B. 240 (bookstore used almost 
exclusively by university faculty and students was exempt as an 
integral part of the university with which it was associated). 
 GHP contends that as long as it would not generate 
unrelated business income if it were merged into any one of the 
other Geisinger System entities, it is exempt as an integral part 
of the System.  The Tax Court, in fact, utilized unrelated 
                     
0
 Although the regulation speaks in terms of parent and 
subsidiary entities, the IRS does not contend that we should 
consider only GHP's relationship with its parent, the 
Foundation, in deciding this appeal. 
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business income concepts in analyzing GHP's claim for exemption. 
See Geisinger II, 100 T.C. at 404-07 (citing, inter alia, Hi-
Plains Hospital v. United States, 670 F.2d 528 (5th Cir. 1982); 
Carle Foundation v. United States, 611 F.2d 1192 (7th Cir. 
1979)).  We agree that an entity seeking exemption as an integral 
part of another cannot primarily be engaged in activity which 
would generate more than insubstantial unrelated business income 
for the other entity.  That much is demonstrated by the remainder 
of 26 C.F.R. § 1.502-1(b), which cautions that 
the subsidiary organization is not exempt 
from tax if it is operated for the primary 
purpose of carrying on a trade or business 
which would be an unrelated trade or business 
(that is, unrelated to exempt activities) if 
regularly carried on by the parent 
organization.  For example, if a subsidiary 
organization is operated primarily for the 
purpose of furnishing electric power to 
consumers other than its parent organization 
(and the parent's tax-exempt subsidiary 
organizations), it is not exempt since such 
business would be an unrelated trade or 
business if regularly carried on by the 
parent organization.  Similarly, if the 
organization is owned by several unrelated 
exempt organizations, and is operated for the 
purpose of furnishing electric power to each 
of them, it is not exempt since such business 
would be an unrelated trade or business if 
regularly carried on by any one of the 
tax-exempt organizations. 
Id. 
 Although 26 C.F.R. § 502-1(b) clearly makes the absence 
of activity constituting an unrelated trade or business a 
necessary qualification for the operation of the integral part 
doctrine, because this regulation speaks in terms of 
disqualification from exemption rather than qualifications for 
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exemption, it does not indicate or explain whether there are any 
other necessary qualifications -- the issue we face in this case. 
 Both the revenue rulings cited earlier and case law 
similarly fail to state a comprehensive rule to assist in 
determining when an entity is exempt as an integral part of 
another.  In Squire v. Students Book Corp., 191 F.2d 1018 (9th 
Cir. 1951), for example, the court ruled that a corporation 
operating a bookstore and restaurant which sold college texts, 
was wholly owned by a college, used college space free of charge, 
served mostly faculty and students, and devoted its earnings to 
educational purposes was exempt because it "obviously bears a 
close and intimate relationship to the functioning of the 
[c]ollege itself."  Squire, 191 F.2d at 1020.  It did not, 
however, provide further explication for its rationale.  See also 
University of Maryland Physicians, P.A. v. Commissioner of 
Internal Revenue, 41 T.C.M. (CCH) 732 (1981); University of 
Massachusetts Medical School Group Practice v. Commissioner of 
Internal Revenue, 74 T.C. 1299 (1980), acq. 1980-2 C.B. 2; B.H.W. 
Anesthesia Foundation, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 
72 T.C. 681 (1979), nonacq. 1980-2 C.B. 2; B.S.W. Group, Inc. v. 
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 70 T.C. 352 (1978); Brundage v. 
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 54 T.C. 1468 (1970), acq. in 
result 1970-2 C.B. xix (addressing "integral part" issue in 
deduction context). 
C. 
 Distilling § 1.502-1(b) and these cases into a general 
rule leads us to conclude that a subsidiary which is not entitled 
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to exempt status on its own may only receive such status as an 
integral part of its § 501(c)(3) qualified parent0 if (i) it is 
not carrying on a trade or business which would be an unrelated 
trade or business (that is, unrelated to exempt activities) if 
regularly carried on by the parent, and (ii) its relationship to 
its parent somehow enhances the subsidiary's own exempt character 
to the point that, when the boost provided by the parent is added 
to the contribution made by the subsidiary itself, the subsidiary 
would be entitled to § 501(c)(3) status. 
 Whether income received by an HMO operated by an entity 
which also directly operates a health care facility would be 
deemed unrelated business income was answered in the negative by 
Sound Health.  Nevertheless, this is a complex issue which will 
probably be further explored by the courts and Congress as the 
entities which pay for health care, and those which provide it, 
begin to intertwine.  Because we find that GHP does not meet the 
second prong of the integral part test articulated above, we need 
not probe the legal soundness of the Sound Health opinion. 
 In considering whether the boost received by GHP from 
its association with GMC or the Clinic might be sufficient, when 
added to its own contribution, to merit § 501(c)(3) treatment, we 
must first look at the nature of the boost which was sufficient 
in those instances where the integral part doctrine has been 
                     
0
 Although we refer to the entity seeking application of the 
integral part doctrine as the "subsidiary" and the current 
holder of the § 501(c)(3) exemption as the "parent," we 
recognize that the relationship, as in this case, may be 
that of entities controlled by a common parent or some other 
form of affiliation. 
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applied.  The electric company discussed in 26 C.F.R. § 502-1(b), 
for example, would not be entitled to an exemption standing 
alone, because the provision of electric power to others is not a 
charitable purpose. 
 However, the fact that the electric company is a 
subsidiary of an exempt university eliminates the characteristic 
which prevented the company from being exempt on its own.  As a 
subsidiary of the university, the electric company acquires the 
purpose of the university -- it produces electricity solely for 
the purpose of allowing education to occur.0  The "boost" it 
receives from its association with the educational institution 
transforms it from a company without to a company with a 
charitable purpose and thus enables it to qualify for tax-exempt 
status as an integral part of that institution. Like the 
electric company, the bookstores in Squire and Rev. Rul. 58-194, 
and the law journal in Rev. Rul. 63-235 had insufficiently 
charitable purposes to qualify for exempt status when considered 
alone. Selling books or a journal to the general public is not 
educational enough to qualify for exempt status as a charitable 
institution.  But because these particular bookstores and this 
particular law journal were subsidiaries of universities and 
aided the universities' exempt missions of educating their 
students, the purposes of the bookstores and journal became more 
                     
0
 The regulation presupposes that the entity seeking exemption 
derives a profit from serving its parent.  26 C.F.R. 
§ 502-1(b). 
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charitable, and they were entitled to an exemption.0  Absent 
receipt of such a "boost," we do not think that an institution is 
entitled to a tax exemption as an integral part.  To hold 
otherwise might enable an organization that is not entitled to an 
exemption on its own to become tax-exempt merely because it 
happens to be controlled by an organization that is itself 
exempt. 
                     
0
 As noted previously, see infra page 14, Rev. Rul. 78-41, 
1978-1 C.B. 148 provides another example of a situation in 
which the IRS has ruled that an organization is exempt as an 
integral part of its parent's exempt functions.  In Rev. 
Rul. 78-41, the IRS ruled that a trust existing solely as a 
repository of funds set aside by a nonprofit hospital for 
the payment of malpractice claims against the hospital, and 
as the payor of those claims, was exempt as an integral part 
of the hospital.  To some extent, this revenue ruling is 
consistent with our understanding of the integral part 
doctrine based upon the statute and the case law:  A trust 
established to pay claims may not be charitable standing 
alone, but by collecting funds for the payment of, and 
paying, solely the malpractice claims filed against a 
nonprofit hospital, this trust was serving the hospital's 
charitable purpose of promoting health by enhancing the 
hospital's ability to continue in business.  Cf. Rev. Rul. 
73-313, 1973-2 C.B. 174 (organization created to build and 
offer medical office building and facilities at a reasonable 
rent to attract a doctor to an isolated area which 
previously lacked medical services was "a method of 
promoting health in the legal sense of the term in the law 
of charity and, therefore, a charitable purpose").  It is 
also true, however, that to some extent this revenue ruling 
conflicts with 26 U.S.C. § 502 and 26 C.F.R. 
§ 1.513-1(d)(3), which, taken together, provide that the 
financing of exempt activities neither renders otherwise 
taxable entities exempt from taxation nor transforms 
unrelated business income into income which is substantially 
related to an exempt purpose and is thus exempt from 
taxation.  Because of the tension we perceive between this 
revenue ruling and the statute and regulations, we will not 
rely on Rev. Rul. 78-41 in our analysis. 
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 Here, we do not think that GHP receives any "boost" 
from its association with the Geisinger System.  In Geisinger I, 
we determined that while GHP helps to promote health, it does not 
do so for a significant enough portion of the community to 
qualify for tax-exempt status on its own.  See Geisinger I, 985 
F.2d at 1219-20.  Cf. Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117 
(promotion of health is a charitable purpose "provided that the 
class [served] is not so small that its relief is not of benefit 
to the community").  And, unlike the electric company, university 
bookstores or law journal in the regulations and case law, the 
contribution that GHP makes to community health is not increased 
at all by the fact that GHP is a subsidiary of the System rather 
than being an independent organization which sends its 
subscribers to a variety of hospitals and clinics. 
 As our examination of the manner in which GHP interacts 
with other entities in the System makes clear, its association 
with those entities does nothing to increase the portion of the 
community for which GHP promotes health -- it serves no more 
people as a part of the System than it would serve otherwise.  It 
may contribute to the System by providing more patients than the 
System might otherwise have served, thus arguably allowing the 
System to promote health among a broader segment of the community 
than could be served without it, but its provision of patients to 
the System does not enhance its own promotion of health; the 
patients it provides -- its subscribers -- are the same patients 
it serves without its association with the System.  To the extent 
it promotes health among non-GHP-subscriber patients of the 
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System, it does so only because GHP subscribers' payments to the 
System help finance the provision of health care to others.  An 
entity's mere financing of the exempt purposes of a related 
organization does not constitute furtherance of that 
organization's purpose so as to justify exemption.  Cf. 26 U.S.C. 
§ 502 ("[a]n organization . . . shall not be exempt from taxation 
under section 501 on the ground that all of its profits are 
payable to one or more organizations exempt from taxation under 
section 501").  Thus, it is apparent that GHP merely seeks to 
"piggyback" off of the other entities in the System, taking on 
their charitable characteristics in an effort to gain exemption 
without demonstrating that it is rendered "more charitable" by 
virtue of its association with them. 
D. 
 It has not escaped our attention, of course, that both 
our decision today and our decision in Geisinger I may either set 
the tone for, or be superseded by, legislative activity in the 
near future.  The executive and the legislative branches are 
currently debating the appropriate parameters of future 
governmental involvement in the provision and financing of health 
care in this country.  The legislation which may result could 
significantly transform the structure and financing of health 
care delivery systems in ways both anticipated and unanticipated.  
Academic commentary on our decision in Geisinger I reinforces our 
common-sense impression that questions regarding the tax-exempt 
status of integrated delivery systems under 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) 
may be addressed during these debates.  See generally Loren 
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Callan Rosenzweig, Geisinger, HMOs and Health Care Reform, Taxes, 
January 1994, at 20; Kenneth L. Levine, Geisinger Health Plan 
Likely to Adversely Affect HMOs and Other Health Organizations, 
J. Taxation, August 1993, at 90. 
 Whatever changes are wrought by the legislature in the 
future, however, today we are constrained to apply the law in its 
current form and to construe tax exemptions narrowly.  Our 
interpretation of the integral part route to exemption under 
section 501(c)(3) reflects those constraints.  Obviously, we 
express no opinion as to whether HMOs, whether structured like 
GHP or like the Sound Health HMO, can or should be exempt from 
federal income taxation after whatever transformation of the 
health care industry may be forthcoming. 
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III. 
 In sum, GHP does not qualify for exemption as an 
integral part of the Geisinger System because its charitable 
character is not enhanced by virtue of its association with the 
System.  We will affirm the decision of the Tax Court. 
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